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May 24, 2005

5th IMC Report

http://www.independentmonitoringcommission.org/documents/uploads/IMC_Report.pdf

FIFTH REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING COMMISSION

Presented to the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government
of Ireland under Articles 4 and 7 of the International Agreement
establishing the Independent Monitoring Commission

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 24th May 2005 HC 46
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CONTENTS

1. Introduction and Context

2. Paramilitary Groups: Assessment of Current Activities

3. Paramilitary Groups: The Incidence of Violence and Exiling

4. The Murder of Robert McCartney

5. Paramilitary Groups: The Activities of Prisoners Released under the
Belfast Agreement

6. Paramilitary Groups: Organised Crime and Other Paramilitary
Activity

7. Responding to Paramilitary Groups: Some Other Issues

8. Paramilitary Groups: Leadership

9. Conclusions and Recommendations

ANNEXES

I Articles 4 and 7 of the International Agreement

II The IMC's Guiding Principles

III Summary of Measures provided for in UK Legislation which may be
recommended for action by the Northern Ireland Assembly by the
Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC)

1. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

1.1 We submit this report on the continuing activities of paramilitary
groups under Articles 4 and 7 of the International Agreement
establishing the Independent Monitoring Commission1. The British and
Irish Governments published our first two full reports on this subject
in April and November 2004 and this report continues the six monthly
cycle required by the International Agreement.

1.2 On 10 February this year the British and Irish Governments
published our ad hoc report specifically on the robbery at the
Northern Bank, Belfast, on 20 December 2004, and on some associated
incidents. We presented that ad hoc report, as we are empowered to by
Article 4, because of the nature of the robbery and all the
surrounding circumstances, both before and after it occurred. We have
drawn the analysis and conclusions of that ad hoc report into the full
account of paramilitary activity which we give here.

1.3 We reiterate two important points we made in our earlier reports.

1.4 First, we continue to be guided by the objective of the Commission
set out in Article 3 of the International Agreement.

The objective of the Commission is to carry out [its functions] with a
view to promoting the transition to a peaceful society and stable and
inclusive devolved Government in Northern Ireland.

1.5 Second, we continue to adhere to the principles about the rule of
law and about democratic government which we enunciated in March last
year, and which are set out in full in Annex II of this report.

1.6 We note that under the terms of the proposals for a comprehensive
agreement which the two Governments published last December we would
have had two specific tasks. The first was to produce an interim
report that same month. The second was

1 The text of Articles 4 and 7 is set out in Annex I.

to present our next regular report on continuing paramilitary
activities (namely this one) in February 2005, the month before the
agreement envisaged the possible restoration of devolved government.
In the event these proposals were not agreed.

We welcome any task that will enable us to contribute to peace and
stability. In this context we draw attention to what we said in our ad
hoc report about the need for us to have an adequate time so as to be
able to make full and rounded assessments of paramilitary activity and
to draw dependable conclusions2.

1.7 During the course of the preparation of this report Sinn Féin
initiated judicial review proceedings in the Northern Ireland courts.
The proceedings addressed the IMC's remit and first report, the action
taken by the Secretary of State as a result of that report, and the
legislation which gives the IMC its statutory foundation in the UK3.

The proceedings taken by Sinn Féin were unsuccessful on all grounds.
Given this outcome we believe it is worth making the following point
clear. We are appointed and report because the Governments of the UK
and of Ireland entered into an International Agreement and the
Parliaments of both countries passed legislation4 implementing it. In
our view this puts beyond any doubt the democratic legitimacy of the
role we have been given.

1.8 In our first report, published in April 2004, we said that
"organised crime in Northern Ireland is significantly greater in its
scale, impact and complexity than it otherwise would be because of the
involvement of paramilitary groups" and we concluded that it might
"present the biggest long-term threat to the rule of law in Northern
Ireland." The information and analysis we set out in subsequent
reports reinforced this view, as does this report. We are therefore
glad to see that the focus of public discussion has significantly
shifted, and that there are increasingly frequent references to all
forms of the crimes which paramilitaries commit.

1.9 We have been asked a number of times how we make our assessments
and on what information we base them. Some have asked us to put more
material in the public domain. Some have challenged us on grounds that
we may be or appear to be

2 IMC Fourth Report, paragraph 16.

3 Northern Ireland (Monitoring Commission etc.) Act 2003.

4 The parallel Irish legislation is the Independent Monitoring
Commission Act 2003.

biased, and we continue carefully to consider that issue. We hope it
would be helpful if we say something about the way we work.

1.10 We believe it is a great strength that the four Commissioners
come from different backgrounds and have different perspectives. We
seek to maximise the benefit this gives us by challenging each others'
thinking as well as challenging those we meet.

We try to develop assessments based on more than one source. We see if
there are links between what we learn from different people and we
expect to be able to triangulate different perspectives before we
reach conclusions. We probe the nature and logic of the information we
receive. We examine whether there are any inconsistencies. We
challenge any gaps there appear to be. We question whether there might
be any bias either in our own approach or in that of others and take
steps to ensure it does not influence our conclusions inappropriately.
We ask ourselves and our interlocutors whether other conclusions might
as reasonably be drawn from the same set of circumstances. We test the
confidence placed in the material and in opinions associated with it.
We do all this before we come to any view, and before we write our
reports. The conclusions we draw are our own.

1.11 Our sources are wide ranging. They include the law enforcement
and other agencies of the UK and Ireland, as well as of any other
country from which we have things to learn. But they are much wider
than that. In addition to government officials and police officers we
have met people from the following categories in Great Britain,
Ireland North and South and in the United States:

Political parties; government officials; police; community groups;
churches; charities; pressure groups and other organisations; former
combatants, including exprisoners; representatives of businesses;
lawyers; journalists; academics; victims; private citizens,
individually and as families.

We urge everybody with something material to our work to get in touch
with us5.

We also try to take account of the work of other boards, commissions
and similar bodies in Northern Ireland and elsewhere6.

1.12 We are very careful what we say in our reports. From the
beginning we have adhered to one firm principle. We treat everything
we hear, including the identities of those who communicate with us, in
complete confidence. Only in this way can they be expected to impart
information to us, and without that information we cannot do the job
the two Governments have charged us with. We will therefore not reveal
our sources, though those people are free to say what they like about
their communications with the IMC. The International Agreement lays
down other constraints on us, for example so that we do not prejudice
legal proceedings or jeopardise anybody's safety. But the most
significant restraint is self-imposed: we will not say anything, or
draw any conclusion, unless we have confidence in it, and we will
qualify conclusions if we think that is necessary. We did this, for
example, in our initial attribution of certain robberies in late
October 20047.

1.13 We are not infallible, but we do believe we are thorough in our
methods and measured in our assessments. If we find one of our
conclusions does not stand up in the light of later information we
will acknowledge this in a subsequent report8.

1.14 We have continued to refine our understanding of the activities
of paramilitary groups and of the associated issues. We share the
generally held aspiration that

5 You can contact the IMC through our website:
www.independentmonitoringcommission.org; by E-mail:
imc@independentmonitoringcommission.org; by post at PO Box 709,
Belfast, BT2 8YB or PO Box 9592, Dublin 1; and by telephone at +44
(0)28 9072 6117 in Belfast and +353 1 4752 555 in Dublin.

6 There are a large number of boards, commissions and other bodies in
Northern Ireland concerned with the criminal justice system, the
maintenance of standards and with the transition to a peaceful
society. They fulfil a variety of roles: executive, supervisory,
monitoring and advisory. All have some form of interest in this issue.
Most are confined to Northern Ireland but some operate on a UK basis.
We are not aware of a comprehensive and publicly available list. We
believe it to be, in alphabetical order: The Chief Inspector of
Criminal Justice; HM Chief Inspector of Prisons; The Commissioner for
Judicial Appointments; The Electoral Commission (UK); Equality
Commission; Independent Assessor of Military Complaints Procedure in
Northern Ireland; Independent Commissioner for Detained Terrorist
Suspects; The Independent Monitoring Commission; Independent Reviewer
of the Terrorism Act (Lord Carlile); Information Commissioner (UK); HM
Inspector of Constabulary; The Interception of Communications
Commissioner (UK); The International Independent Commission on
Decommissioning; The Justice Oversight Commissioner; Northern Ireland
Commissioner for Children and Young People; The Northern Ireland Human
Rights Commission; The Northern Ireland Policing Board; Northern
Ireland Sentence Review Commissioners; The Office of the Oversight
Commissioner; The Parades Commission; The Police Ombudsman for
Northern Ireland; Prisoner Ombudsman for Northern Ireland; The
Probation Board for Northern Ireland; Regulation of Investigation
Powers Act Commissioners. There are also individual inquiries in
Ireland North and South: the Saville Inquiry and those established as
a result of the report of the Cory Inquiry.

7 In our Third Report we said that members of republican paramilitary
groups were responsible for recent large scale robbery and violent
theft but that we could not make more firm attributions. In our Fourth
Report the availability of further information enabled us to attribute
the incidents specifically to PIRA.

8 In our Third Report we said that the attribution of the murder of
Michael O'Hare to an unspecified paramilitary group which we had made
in our First Report was not correct, and we said that we and the PSNI
had offered apologies and an explanation to the family.

paramilitary groups will cease all illegal activity. The Belfast
Agreement of 1998 marked a watershed and, although we recognise that
illegal paramilitary activity will not all be suddenly brought to an
end, the transition to a peaceful society and stable and inclusive
devolved government which it envisaged must not continue indefinitely.

1.15 This aspiration raises two particular questions for us. First are
the indications which would encourage us to assess that a paramilitary
group really was making material progress towards giving up all
illegal activity. Second are the areas we would look at in assessing
whether it had actually done so.

1.16 In addressing the first question on making material progress
towards giving up all illegal activity encouraging indications would
include whether a group had taken the strategic decision to give up
illegal activity; had given a clear lead to its members that they must
do so; and had declared that as a group it had stopped such activity.
Other indications might include: whether the group was taking steps to
end its capability to undertake criminal acts; whether it was co-
operating with the police; and whether it was lifting threats against
people, including those it had exiled.

1.17 As far as the second question is concerned, namely assessing
whether a group had actually stopped illegal activity, we would
continue to monitor and report on whether or not it still:

– used violence in any form; – committed other crimes; – recruited or
trained members; – gathered intelligence, targeted people or procured
material; – exiled or intimidated people.

2. PARAMILITARY GROUPS: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ACTIVITIES

2.1 We make an assessment below of the current activities and state of
preparedness of paramilitary groups, focusing on the period from 1
September 2004 until 28 February 2005. Once again we invite readers to
refer to our first report for our account of the origins and structure
of these groups9.

Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)

2.2 In our previous report we said that CIRA had been more active,
including in efforts to attack the security forces and to maintain its
terrorist capacity, that it was a dangerous organisation capable of
effective sporadic attacks, and that it intended to continue to engage
in terrorism and other crime.

2.3 CIRA has continued to be sporadically active. It has carried on
with its policy of threatening District Policing Partnerships (DPP) in
Northern Ireland, and has issued threats to places at which DPP
meetings were held. In January it forced a taxi to take a bomb to a
Belfast PSNI station, and the next day made a statement indicating
that this was the "start of things to come in 2005". It has monitored
the security force reaction to hoax bombs to help it make future
attacks. It has undertaken both assaults and shootings. Two members
were arrested in the South in January 2005 in possession of an under-
car explosive device. Nine members who had been arrested in 2003 were
sentenced to imprisonment by the Special Criminal Court in Dublin.

2.4 CIRA has undertaken some reorganisation, particularly in the
command structure.

We believe this may indicate an intention to increase its level of
activity. It is taking on new members, has continued to train,
including in the use of rifles and explosives, and it makes efforts to
improve its engineering capacity (particularly in relation to
explosives) and its access to weapons. It has produced home made
explosives and has moved munitions. As before, we believe it is a
dangerous organisation capable of serious if sporadic attacks. It has
no interest in ceasefire and

9 IMC First Report, published April 2004, Section 3 pp 11-18.

we believe that it plans to continue to engage in terrorism and other
crimes, possibly more than in the recent past.

Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)

2.5 In our previous report we said that INLA remained a significant
terrorist group whose members had been active in violence and
organised crime.

2.6 INLA's activities and potential remain essentially the same
although the level of activity is not high and it has not shot or
assaulted people as it had in the previous six month periods. Members
of INLA remain very actively involved in organised crime, including
drugs. We believe it was responsible for the robbery of some £100,000
worth of goods from Debenhams in Belfast in October 2004, and that a
few days before its members had stolen a similar sum from the Ulster
Bank in Strabane having coerced an employee of the branch through
threats to the lives of his family. The threat of the organisation's
more active re-engagement remains.

Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)

2.7 In our previous report we said that the LVF was less active than
it had been, with the exception of organised crime in which it was
deeply involved, and that it did not appear to want to resume
significant violence although it retained the capacity to do so should
that intention change.

2.8 The LVF remains deeply involved in drug dealing, and in some areas
it has recruited people solely for that purpose. On 14 January 2005
cannabis and ecstasy to the value of some £125,000 was discovered in
Holywood along with LVF paraphernalia. In January LVF members fired
shots at a taxi company with UVF connections. We conclude as we did in
our previous report that with the striking exception of organised
crime, especially in the form of drugs, the LVF remains less active
than it used to be, shows no inclination to return to significant
levels of violence, but retains a capacity to do so should its
intentions change.

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)

2.9 In our previous report we said that PIRA continued to maintain its
capacity as a terrorist organisation, had been involved in less
violence, and remained active in certain kinds of organised crime.
There were significant subsequent developments, as we indicated in our
ad hoc Fourth Report in February 2005.

2.10 We said in our ad hoc Fourth Report that we were firmly of the
view that PIRA was responsible for the robbery at the Northern Bank on
20 December 2004 and for three other major robberies in May, September
and October of that year10. All of these cases involved violence or
the threat of violence. It was also responsible for an arson attack
against a fuel depot in early September.

2.11 PIRA continues to seek to maintain its medium term effectiveness.
It recruits and trains new members, including in the use of firearms
and explosives. It continues to gather intelligence. At the end of
September 2004 the police discovered 10,000 rounds of PIRA ammunition
suitable for use in assault rifles, of a type not previously found in
Northern Ireland and manufactured since the Belfast Agreement. This
may have been only part of a larger consignment and it demonstrates
PIRA's continuing efforts to maintain its preparedness. PIRA allowed
some people it had exiled to return home to the Short Strand area of
Belfast after the murder of Robert McCartney. But there is no
indication that PIRA is agreeing to the general return to Northern
Ireland of those it has exiled. We believe that since the end of
August 2004 it was responsible for some 5 shootings and 6 assaults.

PIRA remains heavily engaged in organised crime, including for example
the smuggling of fuel and tobacco. Recent events have shown PIRA's
sophisticated use of money laundering as a means of securing long term
the proceeds of serious crime.

2.12 In view of the attention it has attracted there is one other
matter to which we wish to refer. The proposals for a comprehensive
political agreement in Northern Ireland which the British and Irish
Governments published on 8 December last year spoke

10 IMC Fourth Report, 10 February 2005.

of "an immediate, full and permanent cessation of all paramilitary
activity by the IRA" (ie PIRA). With it was the draft of a statement
which the two Governments had hoped that PIRA would put out in the
event of the successful conclusion of the talks. This draft statement
referred to the need not to endanger anyone's personal rights or
safety and to all PIRA volunteers being instructed not to engage in
any activity which might endanger the new agreement. The statement
which the PIRA actually put out following the failure to achieve an
agreement contained the last phrase, but not the reference to ensuring
the rights and safety of everybody. Two things are clear from what we
say in this report and from our account of the activities of PIRA in
our ad hoc report. First, there have continued to be occasions before
and since early December 2004 when the rights and safety of others
have been disregarded. Second, the manifest abuse of safety and rights
which the abductions and robbery at the Northern Bank involved were
being planned long before the December announcements; we are unable to
say whether they would have been called off had there been a political
agreement.

2.13 We conclude therefore that PIRA remains a highly active
organisation. We note that in November 2004 two men were convicted of
PIRA membership at the Special Criminal Court in Dublin, and a further
five in February of this year. We believe that PIRA is at present
determined to maintain its effectiveness, both in terms of organised
crime, control in republican areas, and the potential for terrorism.
We have no present evidence that it intends to resume a campaign of
violence despite the collapse of political talks in December 2004, but
its capacity remains should that become the intention.

Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)

2.14 In our previous report we said that RIRA – within which there
were two factions - remained an active organisation engaged in acts of
terrorism and organised crime.

It sought to maintain its capacity, though that did not always match
its aspirations.

2.15 RIRA has continued to be the most active of the dissident
republican groups and has been responsible both for brutal attacks and
for robbery. It sent explosive postal packages to DPP members in
September 2004 and again in January and February

2005. That same month, and again in October and December, it undertook
shooting attacks against PSNI stations. It exiled somebody whom it had
previously shot. It undertook a number of assaults. And in the run up
to Christmas we believe it conducted a campaign of hoax and genuine
explosive devices at commercial premises in different parts of
Northern Ireland and sent further hoax devices in the New Year. In
January 2005 it destroyed a store in Strabane by arson, and in
February petrol bombed a person's home. RIRA has also recruited,
trained members in the use of firearms and targeted police officers.
It has continued efforts to improve its capacity in the use of
explosives. We believe this is the work of an organisation which is
ruthless and committed to terrorism. There have been some arrests of
RIRA members in Northern Ireland and the South and three people are
awaiting trial in the Special Criminal Court in Dublin. The
organisation remains a threat.

Ulster Defence Association (UDA)

2.16 In our previous report we said that the UDA had planned to avoid
disorder over the summer but had undertaken shootings and assaults,
and was heavily involved in organised crime.

2.17 In November last year the Secretary of State announced the de-
specification of the UDA following its statement that it would desist
from all "military activity", focus on social and economic issues
within the community, and work with the British Government towards an
end to all paramilitary activity. Part of the period under review in
this report therefore fell before this statement.

2.18 In September and October 2004 the UDA were involved in both
violence and targeting. Members of the UDA shot Darren Thompson on 29
September 2004 (he died on 1 October)11. On 19 September 2004 UDA
members, with the approval of the local leadership, attacked Stephen
Nelson who died on 18 March 2005. As part of a dispute with the LVF in
Belfast they were responsible for an arson attack in late October. At
the end of November 7 UDA members and an eighth associate were 11 See
Section 3, paragraph 3.4.

arrested before being able to commit an abduction and armed robbery,
which were known to the North Belfast leadership of the organisation.
More recently, they have engaged in targeting in anticipation of a
possible dispute with the LVF following the release of Johnny Adair
from prison in January 2005, and have monitored dissident republicans
with a view to mounting attacks if they themselves are attacked. In
January 2005 UDA members forced two families from their homes. We have
found nothing to suggest that the UDA has agreed to the return to
Northern Ireland of people it has exiled or that it is considering
doing so. The organisation was, we believe, responsible for shootings
and assaults. It remains involved in organised crime, and members were
responsible for two robberies in February and March 2005.

2.19 We have always recognised that transition may be a messy and
difficult process for a paramilitary group. To date it is not clear if
the UDA will achieve the transition it pointed to in its statement of
November 2004. Certainly the process is still very far from complete,
and the fact remains that during the period under review it was
responsible for 2 murders.

Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Red Hand Commando (RHC)

2.20 In our previous report we concluded that the UVF remained active
and violent and that it continued to be involved in organised crime.

2.21 This is still the case. The UVF undertook a number of attacks
over Christmas and New Year as part of its continuing conflict with
the LVF. Members of the same UVF unit shot at LVF members in Belfast
in mid-January, as a result of which one person has been charged with
attempted murder. It has also undertaken the targeting of rivals. It
continues to recruit members. Several of the loyalist shootings and
assaults over the period covered in Section 3 of this report can be
attributed to the UVF and RHC. The UVF is also engaged in organised
crime. Our previous conclusion thus stands. The UVF is active, violent
and ruthless, and is prepared to use violence to promote what it sees
as the interests of the organisation. We believe it would undertake
greater violence than in recent months if it judged that those
interests so required.

3. PARAMILITARY GROUPS: THE INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE AND EXILING

3.1 This Section concentrates on, but is not entirely confined to, the
6 months since the end of August 2004. It compares them with the three
preceding 6 month periods.

3.2 We want first to remind the reader of two points we have made
before in this context but which are equally important now:

– Behind the bare statistics which we set out below lie vicious acts
of cruelty that have left people permanently disabled and
psychologically scarred.

– No criminal statistics can record the far more numerous occasions on
which paramilitaries have intimidated people, thereby achieving the
same ends through a fear which is none the less real because it stops
short of actual violence. As we have said before, the activities
described below are therefore only part of a continuing web of
intimidation which particularly afflicts some local communities in
Northern Ireland.

3.3 We have also noted before our rejection of the term "punishment
beating". This is not because of some special sensitivity on our part
or a desire to appear correct. It is because we believe that the word
"punishment" serves merely to attach an air of respectability to a
particularly nasty kind of lawless cruelty and misleads as to the wide
range of purposes for which this violence is inflicted – not only to
establish or maintain control within communities, as it implies, but
in pursuit of acquisitive crime, against rival paramilitary groups and
inter-communally. The word "beating" grossly underplays the severity
of what the paramilitaries all too often inflict. We think the time
has come when public figures and institutions should give a lead and
stop using "punishment" in this context, and that the media should do
likewise save where they feel obliged to do so in the interests of
accurate reporting.

Paramilitary Violence 1 September 2004 to 28 February 2005

3.4 Over the 6 months from 1 September 2004 until 28 February 2005 we
believe that the number of paramilitary murders was as follows:

1 September 2004 – 1 March – 1 September 2003 – 1 March – 28 February
2005 31 August 2004 29 February 2004 31 August 2003 CIRA INLA LVF 1
PIRA * RIRA 1 UDA 2 1 1 UVF 2 1 Not attributable 112 213 TOTAL 2 3 2 5
Thus the total number of murders is similar to that in the two
previous 6 month periods.

The following paramilitary murders have occurred since 1 September
2004:

Darren Thompson, shot 29 September 2004; died 1 October 2004.

Stephen Nelson, attacked 19 September 2004, died 18 March 2005.

The question might be raised of why the murder of Robert McCartney is
not included in the above figures and box. The detailed categorisation
of the murder is not yet definitive and for this reason it is
asterisked in the table.

We are not yet in a position to comment on the killing of Stephen
Montgomery on 13 February 2005 or the disappearance of Lisa Dorrian on
28 February 2005.

3.5 The number of casualties of paramilitary shootings and assaults in
the 6 months since 1 September 2004 is as follows. As before, in these
tables, and in the associated text and graphs, the figures and
attributions are both subject to minor statistical adjustment.

12 Information suggests this death may have been linked to a
republican paramilitary group but the precise motivation and
attributions remains unclear.

13 One of these was abducted and murdered by a republican group but we
are unable to say which. One was a member of PIRA killed in the
struggle when attempting to undertake a paramilitary attack.

Shooting Casualties Responsible 1 September 2004 – 1 March – 1
September 2003 – 1 March – Group 28 February 2005 31 August 2004 29
February 2004 31 August 2003 Loyalist 36 39 69 34 Republican 8 11 19
35 TOTAL 44 50 88 69 Assault Casualties Responsible 1 September 2004 –
1 March – 1 September 2003 – 1 March – Group 28 February 2005 31
August 2004 29 February 2004 31 August 2003 Loyalist 30 42 57 46
Republican 24 18 26 24 TOTAL 54 60 83 70

3.6 Our remit requires us to look at trends in paramilitary crime. The
following graphs include the monthly figures we have previously
published, extended by 6 months until 28 February 2005 so that the
trends in shootings and assaults are clear.

18 Exiling

3.7 In our Third Report published in November we commented at some
length on the use of exiling by paramilitary groups. In declaring our
abhorrence of this long-standing practice, which we described as one
of the most insidious aspects of paramilitary activity, we made the
following main points:

- It was an expression of paramilitary power and a means of exerting
control over individuals and communities which existed only because of
the known readiness of paramilitaries to resort to violence to secure
their way. As such it was both a symptom of the pressure they exerted
and a means of continuing it:

- It had a devastating effect on the individual and his (usually, his)
family, and could ruin the person's life chances; - Exiling by
loyalist groups appeared to have increased since July 2003.

3.8 Since then we have met victims of paramilitary assaults and
shootings, including those for whom exiling had been a real and deeply
terrifying prospect. Discussion with these victims brought home to us
just how traumatic the effect of exiling could be, uprooting people –
often those poorly equipped in terms of education and of social and
vocational skills – from everything that was familiar to them and
casting them into an environment where they would receive none of the
support they needed if they were to have any reasonable hope of making
worthwhile progress in their lives. It is of course just this
traumatic impact on which the paramilitaries rely, to the point where
we have heard that some would prefer successive assaults to exiling.
This is one further indication of malign influence which
paramilitaries exert.

PARAMILITARY-STYLE SHOOTINGS:

NUMBER OF CASUALTIES BETWEEN JANUARY 2003 TO FEBRUARY 2005

TOTALS OVER THE PERIOD:
LOYALIST SHOOTING CASUALTIES - 200
REPUBLICAN SHOOTING CASUALTIES - 84

Figures and attributions for the above period are both subject to
minor statistical adjustment

3.9 It remains the case that there are no accurate figures on the
extent of exiling. Instances are known within communities but are
seldom reported to the authorities so that no comprehensive picture is
available. However, information we have been given – which we cannot
therefore test or verify as we would like – suggests there has been no
slackening in the extent of exiling since we last reported and that it
is roughly evenly split between loyalists and republicans. We do not
have any evidence that paramilitary groups have agreed to the general
return to their homes of those whom they have exiled and who want to
come back, or are considering doing so.

Conclusions

3.10 We draw the following conclusions:

- While the level of paramilitary violence is still high, with one
exception the downward trend apparent in the two preceding six month
periods has continued.

- There were 2 paramilitary murder victims in the period from 1
September 2004 to 28 February 2005. This is broadly the same as in the
two previous six month periods.

- Averaged out, there were nearer 2 victims of shootings a week than
1, and about 2 victims of assault a week over the same period.

- Since 1 September 2004 there have been fewer victims of violence
short of murder, the reduction being larger in the case of shootings
than of assaults. Loyalists continue to commit more violence than
republicans: over four times as many shooting victims and 25% more
victims of assault. But the one figure which does not show the
continuing downward trend is that for republican assaults.

- The changes may be summarised as follows:

Republican Groups - Shooting casualties are down by 27% compared with
the preceding six month period and down by 58% compared with the
corresponding period in 2003-2004.

PARAMILITARY-STYLE ASSAULTS: NUMBER OF CASUALTIES BETWEEN JANUARY 2003
TO FEBRUARY 2005 TOTALS OVER THE PERIOD: LOYALIST PARAMILITARY-STYLE
ASSAULTS – 188 REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARY-STYLE ASSAULTS - 96 Figures and
attributions for the above period are both subject to minor
statistical adjustment Exiling

3.7 In our Third Report published in November we commented at some
length on the use of exiling by paramilitary groups. In declaring our
abhorrence of this longstanding practice, which we described as one of
the most insidious aspects of paramilitary activity, we made the
following main points:

– It was an expression of paramilitary power and a means of exerting
control over individuals and communities which existed only because of
the known readiness of paramilitaries to resort to violence to secure
their way.

As such it was both a symptom of the pressure they exerted and a means
of continuing it:

– It had a devastating effect on the individual and his (usually, his)
family, and could ruin the person's life chances; – Exiling by
loyalist groups appeared to have increased since July 2003.

3.8 Since then we have met victims of paramilitary assaults and
shootings, including those for whom exiling had been a real and deeply
terrifying prospect. Discussion with these victims brought home to us
just how traumatic the effect of exiling could be, uprooting people –
often those poorly equipped in terms of education and of social and
vocational skills – from everything that was familiar to them and
casting them into an environment where they would receive none of the
support they needed if they were to have any reasonable hope of making
worthwhile progress in their lives. It is of course just this
traumatic impact on which the paramilitaries rely, to the point where
we have heard that some would prefer successive assaults to exiling.
This is one further indication of malign influence which
paramilitaries exert.

3.9 It remains the case that there are no accurate figures on the
extent of exiling.

Instances are known within communities but are seldom reported to the
authorities so that no comprehensive picture is available. However,
information we have been given – which we cannot therefore test or
verify as we would like – suggests there has been no slackening in the
extent of exiling since we last reported and that it is roughly evenly
split between loyalists and republicans. We do not have any evidence
that paramilitary groups have agreed to the general return to their
homes of those whom they have exiled and who want to come back, or are
considering doing so.

Conclusions

3.10 We draw the following conclusions:

– While the level of paramilitary violence is still high, with one
exception the downward trend apparent in the two preceding six month
periods has continued.

– There were 2 paramilitary murder victims in the period from 1
September 2004 to 28 February 2005. This is broadly the same as in the
two previous six month periods.

– Averaged out, there were nearer 2 victims of shootings a week than
1, and about 2 victims of assault a week over the same period.

– Since 1 September 2004 there have been fewer victims of violence
short of murder, the reduction being larger in the case of shootings
than of assaults. Loyalists continue to commit more violence than
republicans: over four times as many shooting victims and 25% more
victims of assault. But the one figure which does not show the
continuing downward trend is that for republican assaults.

– The changes may be summarised as follows:

Republican Groups – Shooting casualties are down by 27% compared with
the preceding six month period and down by 58% compared with the
corresponding period in 2003-2004.

– Assault casualties are up by 33% when compared with the preceding
six month period and down by 8% when compared with the corresponding
period in 2003-2004.

Loyalist Groups – Shooting casualties are down by 8% when compared
with the preceding six month period and down by 48% when compared with
the corresponding period in 2003-2004.

– Assault casualties are down by 29% when compared with the preceding
six month period and down by 47% when compared with the corresponding
period in 2003-2004.

– Exiling continues to be an ugly feature of paramilitary crime and we
have no indication that its extent has slackened.

3.11 We are aware that these figures alone do not give the full
picture of paramilitary violence, for example because they disguise
local variations. We plan to examine such issues in future reports. We
would welcome views on both the trends in these figures and the
explanations for them.

4. THE MURDER OF ROBERT McCARTNEY

4.1 We think it is right to comment specifically on the murder of
Robert McCartney, though we are very constrained in what we can say.
There may be criminal proceedings and Article 13 of the International
Agreement requires us to do nothing which would prejudice a legal case
or put anybody's safety at risk.

4.2 Robert McCartney was murdered outside Magennis's Bar in central
Belfast on the evening of 30 January 2005. Another man, Brendan
Devine, was stabbed in the same incident. We believe that members of
PIRA were involved in the murder. We do not believe that the central
PIRA leadership sanctioned it in advance, but those concerned may have
believed they were acting at the direction of a local senior PIRA
member at the scene. After the event there was prompt PIRA
intervention to protect its members and to obstruct the investigation,
including by cleaning up the scene and by the intimidation of
witnesses. By their immediate and subsequent interventions PIRA put
the organisation and its members ahead of justice.

4.3 PIRA has issued a succession of statements on the murder. On 16
February it said that it had not been involved and that nothing should
be done to impede the family's wishes for justice. On 25 February it
announced it had dismissed three members following internal
disciplinary proceedings, that one of these three had made a statement
to a solicitor and the other two had been advised to do so. It said it
would not tolerate (sic) the intimidation of those who wanted to help
the family. On 8 March it referred to further discussions with the
family, repeated its view that it believed those responsible should
come forward, and said the PIRA sought only "truth and justice" and
that it had told members of the family it was prepared to shoot those
directly involved. This last claim to the right to impose summary
justice attracted world-wide condemnation. In its Easter statement
PIRA referred for the first time explicitly to the murder being a
crime and that it was wrong.

4.4 Senior members of Sinn Féin have made a number of public
references to the murder. They included encouragement to those with
information to come forward so that the people responsible could be
brought to justice, and included references to supporting the family's
wish to see the perpetrators in court; referred to the need for those
responsible to account for their actions; supported the family's
demand for truth and justice; and referred to the suspension of twelve
members of its organisation. There was also criticism by Sinn Féin of
the police investigation.

Sinn Féin advised people to use other avenues for the indirect
transmission of material to the police. But we note with regret that
insufficient evidence has emerged to enable charges to be brought as
we present this report.

4.5 Throughout these tragic events Robert McCartney's family have set
an example to everybody by their courage and determination. Their
demand has always been for justice, never for revenge. Throughout they
have recognised that this crime could be properly dealt with only
through the working of the justice system. The general acceptance of
this principle would get to the root of many of the problems
associated with paramilitary crime.

5. PARAMILITARY GROUPS: THE ACTIVITIES OF PRISONERS RELEASED UNDER THE
BELFAST AGREEMENT

5.1 We have made clear before that we want those who have given up
criminality to engage as fully as possible in all aspects of social
and economic life. This is the case whether or not they have served a
term of imprisonment. We have expressed our admiration of all those
who work to promote peace and understanding and to develop communities
in paid and voluntary capacities. We know that ex-prisoners are
amongst those who make valuable contributions in these ways, and
indeed that by virtue of their past they may be able to play a
particularly key role. We have met some of them, have seen their work
at first hand and have been impressed by what we saw. We welcome too
the readiness of ex-prisoner groups from both communities to explore
publicly with each other how they can contribute to the reintegration
of their members and to social development, learning from each other
in the process.

5.2 The key factor is that ex-prisoners should have put criminality
behind them and have engaged in the life of the community as law
abiding citizens. But not all exprisoners have done this. It is our
task to report on paramilitary activity and we are keen to fulfil it
from as many angles as we can. We believe that one indication of the
strength and nature of paramilitarism and of the attitude of the
leaders of paramilitary groups to its continuation, is whether those
released have resumed criminal activity, and if they have, whether it
is of a paramilitary kind.

5.3 To pursue this question we have taken a preliminary look at those
who were released in Northern Ireland under the terms of the Belfast
Agreement although at this stage we have not been able to take our
enquiries as far as we would wish.

These ex-prisoners are an identifiable category of people whose
release took place over a relatively short period and was associated
with a major step towards peace and normality – the watershed of the
Belfast Agreement to which we refer above.

What we say below relates to activities at any time during the whole
period from the time of release until September 2004. It does not mean
that these people are actively engaged as we submit this report.

5.4 Of the 447 people released under the terms of the Belfast
Agreement in Northern Ireland, as implemented in the Northern Ireland
(Sentences) Act 199814, we have looked at the cases of the 430 who had
paramilitary links before their imprisonment.

We have examined the different groups and the different ways in which
released prisoners have become re-involved in paramilitary and/or
criminal activities.

5.5 Those with prior paramilitary links released under the 1998 Act
were as follows:

Responsible Number Percentage Group Releasedof Total CIRA 0 0% INLA 29
7% LVF 19 4% PIRA 209 49% RIRA 0 0% UDA/UFF 103 24% UVF/RHC 70 16%
TOTAL 430

5.6 There are three main aspects:

– How many have been charged with and convicted of crimes or have
prosecutions pending? – How many have in some way become re-involved
with paramilitary organisations? – How many have become involved in
organised crime15?

14 The Belfast Agreement provided for the establishment of a programme
of accelerated release of prisoners convicted of scheduled offences.

It was implemented by the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act of that
year. The scheme required the Sentence Review Commissioners to release
qualifying prisoners where they were satisfied that various conditions
were met, which included that the prisoner was not a supporter of a
specified organisation, was not likely to become one, would not commit
acts of terrorism, and in relation to life sentence prisoners, would
not be a danger to the public if released immediately. Those released
are under licence and subject to recall for its breach during the
period when they would otherwise have been in prison.

15 For the purposes of this analysis we define this as drugs
(importation, sale, distribution); the smuggling of fuel and tobacco;
the sale and distribution of contraband alcohol and tobacco;
counterfeiting; fraud and money laundering; robbery and hijacking; and
extortion.

5.7 Information on the released prisoners who have been charged and
convicted of criminal offences, or have prosecutions pending, is
precise and in the public domain. In the period until September 2004,
some 3% of the prisoners released in Northern Ireland had been
convicted or were being prosecuted for paramilitary type offences and
11% for non-paramilitary offences, making a total of 14%. The
proportion varies considerably between the different groups and
between paramilitary and non-paramilitary activity, as the following
table indicates.

Conviction or Prosecution Paramilitary activity – Non-paramilitary
activity (charged and convicted, or (charged and convicted, or Total
prosecution pending) prosecution pending) Number % of members Number %
of members Number % of members released released released INLA 1 3 1 3
2 7 LVF 4 21 1 5 5 26 PIRA 4 2 15 7 19 9 UDA/UFF 4 4 14 14 18 18
UVF/RHC 1 1 14 20 15 21 TOTAL 14 3 45 11 59 14 Thus the two republican
groups have the lowest percentage of released members convicted or
with a prosecution pending. The LVF had by far the highest percentage
for paramilitary offences, and the UVF/RHC the highest for
nonparamilitary offences, in each case at around one released prisoner
in five and one in seven respectively being convicted or with a
prosecution pending. (The figures for the South suggest a very low
level of minor offending for the equivalent groups of people).

5.8 Inevitably information on the second and third issues – re-
involvement in paramilitary organisations and in organised crime in
Northern Ireland – is far less precise and is not generally in the
public domain. For that reason we need to subject this information to
the kind of scrutiny we described above and we hope to return to the
issue in a future report. The picture appears to be broadly as
follows. We should welcome comments on what we say:

– The level of re-involvement in paramilitary activity appears to be
substantially higher than that for conviction or pending prosecution.
Reinvolvement is also a broad term and could in some circumstances
mean, for example, that somebody exercised a restraining influence. It
seems that a substantial proportion of all the released prisoners have
been reinvolved at some time over the period since their release,
though not necessarily continuously or at the present time. It is
important to note that licences may have expired at the time of these
activities so that the person was not liable to recall. It appears
that there are differences between groups. There also appears to be
some variation between groups in the nature of the activity. For many
the main activity seems to have been the exercise of command within
the group or control within the community.

But in every group some were apparently involved in serious criminal
activities.

– The level of involvement in organised crime appears to be a good
deal lower, although a high proportion of those involved in organised
crime were also involved in the paramilitary activities referred to
above. As is to be expected, the nature of the organised crime
reflects the nature of the crimes in which the group is mainly
involved.

– Overall this suggests that of the people released in Northern
Ireland under the Belfast Agreement with former paramilitary links a
considerable proportion were apparently involved in either
paramilitary activity or organised crime, or both.

5.9 We want to refine and develop in the future our analysis and
assessment of data available to us about re-involvement in
paramilitary activity, and involvement in organised crime before
commenting further on this. In the meantime if people would provide us
with any additional material or with views on the subject we would
very much welcome that.

6. PARAMILITARY GROUPS: ORGANISED CRIME AND OTHER PARAMILITARY
ACTIVITY Organised Crime

6.1 In our previous full report we described the seriousness of the
threat posed by organised criminals associated with paramilitary
groups and how there was no reason to think that the threat would
lessen as conventional terrorism declined – indeed some reason to fear
the opposite. We saw organised crime as a major continuing legacy of
terrorism, with some 60% of all organised crime gangs in Northern
Ireland, and some two thirds of the most serious gangs involved in
international activities, having paramilitary links. We pointed out
that these paramilitary associations brought to organised crime a
ruthlessness, expertise and infrastructure that was unique to Northern
Ireland.

6.2 We have continued our analysis of paramilitary organised crime,
this time from two particular angles. We have looked at the activities
of some of the crime gangs associated with different paramilitary
groups, and we have analysed some aspects of how organised crime
operates through legitimate businesses and what obstacles there may be
to making an effective response to this. We have also identified
issues we want to explore in future reports.

Organised Crime – individual gangs

6.3 Our analysis of a number of individual gangs has reinforced the
concerns we previously expressed. We have looked at gangs with a wide
range of criminal activities, all involving some combination of
violence and means of gaining very substantial resources, often by
exploiting the border. The range of the different activities of one
gang can be very striking, as we illustrate in the box below. Some
gang leaders have been deeply committed to crime and terrorism for
over twenty years; they are ruthless and experienced, sometimes with
past convictions but skilled in avoiding detection. All have roots in
communities where their paramilitary infrastructure and use of
intimidation enables them to shelter. They vary in the extent to which
the proceeds are for personal or organisational gain,

though in all cases the personal element is significant. But as it was
put to us, it matters not at all to the victim where the proceeds end
up – those who are robbed or subjected to extortion are victims
whoever gains, as are those led into drug dependency so as to support
the trade which makes some paramilitaries very rich.

Society too is often the victim in a larger sense in the case of
crimes such as smuggling and counterfeiting.

Activities of two paramilitary crime gangs Gang 1 Gang 2 Money
laundering Robbery Robbery and kidnapping Smuggling and sale of fuel
Smuggling and sale of drugs Smuggling and sale of tobacco Extortion
Manufacture and sale of counterfeit goods Nightclubs Theft and resale
of vehicles Counterfeit currency Organised Crime – Use of legitimate
businesses

6.4 The paramilitary use of legitimate business goes back a long time
and is complex.

As is to be expected, it varies between individual paramilitary groups
and between loyalists and republicans. On the whole, republicans have
a more organised and structured approach to involvement in business,
less reliant than are loyalists on individuals.

6.5 Money fuels paramilitary groups and they use it for a variety of
purposes: to procure weapons and munitions; to pay their members; to
support families, less often now of prisoners but still of those
killed or on the run; to meet the logistical costs of operating day to
day, such as transport, premises and communications; and in some cases
the costs of political activity. None of them is cheap; together they
show that paramilitaries cannot operate on a shoestring.

6.6 Funds for these purposes have long come from donations and from
criminal activities such as those to which we refer above. They also
come from businesses, normally purchased with money gained illegally
and then run as enterprises operating for profit. These businesses may
be entirely legitimate or they may mix lawful trade with illegal
activities, as for example in the case of pubs or garages selling
commercially purchased products alongside smuggled alcohol or fuel.

Businesses which operate in part illegally may well employ staff who
are unconnected with paramilitaries and ignorant of the illegality.

6.7 The reasons for moving into fully or partly legitimate business
can be varied. The cover it offers might be helpful for political
activity; it offers sources of funds that are lower risk to both the
organisation and its individual members; it provides better protection
for the organisation's assets; and those involved have the prospect of
an income into the future. The paramilitaries are likely to have
laundered the funds for the purchase of these businesses, passing
illicit money through a series of exchanges so that its origin is very
hard to identify until it can safely be used to invest in lawful
enterprises. To do this the group is likely to have used sympathetic
legal and financial experts.

6.8 We have looked at the paramilitary use of licensed premises and at
their involvement in security firms and with taxis. These areas have
characteristics appealing to paramilitaries. They provide
opportunities to move significant quantities of cash, including in
parallel with but outside the normal accounts; they have their roots
in local communities, thus securing a measure of protection; they are
susceptible to the use of intimidation; licensed premises provide
opportunities for the retailing of smuggled goods, and taxis for
distributing them at community level.

6.9 Paramilitary groups own, control or make use of licensed premises.
They can provide a lucrative source of income as well as opportunities
to launder money and dispose of illegal goods. Paramilitary
involvement is often closely associated with the use of threats or
other means of exercising local control.

6.10 Northern Ireland has some 1500 pubs and nearly 150 licensed
hotels. The licensing system is comparable to those elsewhere in the
UK and Ireland but it does not prevent paramilitaries profiting from
licensed premises through some combination of threat and the use of
apparently respectable front people. It does not therefore address in
the round the problem which we are charged with monitoring, namely
paramilitary activity. We recognise that there are ample opportunities
for objection to be made to unsuitable licensees or premises. But we
have been struck by the difficulty of pulling together a holistic
view. Companies Register gives information on directors and accounts;
the Land Registry and the Registry of Deeds on the ownership of
premises; local courts give information on the name of the licence
holder; credit reference agencies on the credit worthiness of
licensees or directors.

None of these are linked. Other organisations hold information on
people of a kind properly not in the public domain, such as tax,
social security and driving licences.

But, to give one example, there is no ready means of drawing together
the information on company accounts or directors with that on the
licensees whose pubs often trade under company names. Nor, perhaps
more important, does there seem to be a single holistic view of all
the publicly available and confidential material.

6.11 It is widely and correctly believed that paramilitary groups play
some part in the security business. We have received direct evidence
of building firms which have been subjected to pressure by so-called
security firms, and have suffered extortion as a result. We know too
of other examples of paramilitary involvement, such as in providing
doormen and event security. Every such instance exposes legitimate
operations to pressure. It is the use of paramilitary muscle which
enables them to raise substantial sums of apparently clean money. The
relationship between a security firm and a paramilitary group may be
indirect, and indeed on the surface it has to be in order to
circumvent the licensing regime which has long existed.

Symbiotic relationships between criminals and apparently legitimate
operators are however notoriously difficult to investigate and
control.

6.12 The control regime in Northern Ireland is on the face of it less
stringent than that in England and Wales, which the Scottish Executive
has decided should be applied in Scotland as well. The Northern
Ireland regulations ensure that the owners or directors are not
themselves unsuitable, and it allows action to be taken if it comes to
light that they are. But there is no inspection process as there is in
England and Wales and no one authority which has an overview of all
the means of detecting illegality and a responsibility for following
information up - tax or other aspects of a company's finance; the
social security position of employees; criminal intelligence on staff,
directors and their associates, including powers to prevent companies
being passed on to associates who are ostensibly clean and to prevent
the disclosure of sensitive material. In short, there is a licensing
regime but not an authority charged with the prevention of
paramilitary infiltration by all means available. Yet we believe such
infiltration is the key danger and that there should be a means of
tackling it as one aspect of addressing the problem of paramilitary
involvement in organised crime in the round.

6.13 We note the view of Lord Carlile in his review of the operation
during 2004 of the Terrorism Act 2000 that continuing consideration
should be given to extending the licensing system for England and
Wales to Northern Ireland; he mentions that there may be difficulties
in doing so exactly. We know that the Northern Ireland Office is
reviewing the existing arrangements, taking account of both the system
in England and Wales and that in the South, as is necessary because
some paramilitary organisations operate on an all-Ireland basis. We
welcome this and will wish to return to the issue in a later report.

6.14 Taxi businesses controlled by paramilitaries show some similar
characteristics, and give rise to some similar conclusions. Although a
licence is required to drive a taxi lawfully none is needed to operate
a taxi business. We believe that paramilitaries control some
businesses, and while the individual drivers may not themselves be
members of the organisation they may find themselves obliged to
undertake tasks which benefit the paramilitaries such as the delivery
of drugs or illicit tobacco. Taxi driving is essentially a cash based
activity and drivers in these circumstances typically pay their
employing depot in cash. They may be prevented from moving to work
with a rival firm. Legitimate operators may be forced out of business,
thus harming the interests of the very communities that some
paramilitaries claim to support. Thus drivers and legitimate
businesses may be victims. All this provides opportunities for the
laundering of money and for supporting other criminal activities such
as smuggling. It rests in part on the exertion of paramilitary control
over individuals and communities.

6.15 We do not suggest at all that this is the normal state of affairs
with taxis in Northern Ireland or wish in any way to tarnish the
reputation of lawful operators. We also recognise that some lawful
operators face major pressure from those who operate illegally. But
these activities are one manifestation of paramilitarism. It prompts
questions about the need for powers to regulate not only drivers but
also businesses so as to increase the pressure on paramilitary groups
by reducing, and ideally preventing, the opportunities they have to
operate illegally in the normal economy, and so both to generate
ostensibly lawful income and to support their other illegal
activities.

6.16 The very involvement of paramilitaries means that the police and
other enforcers such as the tax authorities face even more formidable
difficulties in obtaining usable evidence than is often the case with
activities on the fringe of the legitimate economy. We recognise that
much law enforcement effort is going into combating these sorts of
activities. We also welcome the careful thought that is being given to
some aspects of enhanced controls which would further combat these
activities, as we indicate above. But we are not persuaded that a
sufficiently strategic view has been taken of paramilitary involvement
in all activities where there is an ostensibly lawful business.
Through the Organised Crime Task Force (OCTF), to which we refer
below, law enforcement bodies are taking a very welcome multi-agency
approach. The same targeted multi-agency thinking does not seem to
apply to these licensing and control regimes. The challenge is to bear
down in all possible ways on illegal paramilitary activities. The
control or licensing regimes that apply to ordinary businesses should
in our view be fashioned as far as possible to face that challenge in
the round. These regimes must operate in close conjunction with other
law enforcement as a concerted means of addressing paramilitary
activity. We intend to return to this question in future reports and
will be discussing it with interested parties.

Responding to Organised Crime

6.17 The OCTF, which is a networking rather than executive body,
brings an interagency focus to the strategic response to organised
crime in Northern Ireland. We welcome the review which the Secretary
of State announced in February to explore what more the partners which
it brings together can do and await the outcome with interest.

6.18 The British Government is intending to establish a new national
agency directed against organised crime – the Serious and Organised
Crime Agency (SOCA), due to come fully into operation in 2006. SOCA
will not materially affect the lead role that the PSNI now has on
organised crime though it will assume some of the responsibilities of
HM Customs & Excise who are key partners in the fight against
organised crime, and so the paramilitaries, in Northern Ireland. HM
Customs & Excise has increased the resources it devotes to combating
Northern Irish organised crime in recent years. In our view it is
essential that the establishment of SOCA does not in any way diminish
the present focus or lessen these resources. We hope on the contrary
that SOCA's assumption of the investigative responsibilities for
customs and excise offences will enable the effort in Northern Ireland
to be increased by making the resources of a larger law enforcement
agency available.

We will follow with close interest the introduction of these changes
and their impact on paramilitary organised crime, as we will the other
changes due to take place in the UK – the amalgamation of HM Customs
and Excise with Inland Revenue into HM Revenue and Customs, and the
assumption by the Security Service in Northern Ireland of lead
responsibility for national security intelligence work.

Assets Recovery

6.19 We noted in our previous full report the importance of assets
recovery in the fight against paramilitary organised crime and the
value of the work of the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA), the police and
customs in Northern Ireland and of the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) in
the South. The adoption of a strategic approach to assets recovery,
within the overall OCTF strategy, is vital to maximising ARA's
contribution. We are glad to see the progress there has been on a
number of the points we referred to before. The simplification of the
civil recovery process recently enacted in the UK, and the publication
earlier in the year of new guidelines enabling ARA to work in parallel
with other law enforcement agencies before a decision is taken on
whether to proceed through prosecution or civil recovery, are both
welcome developments. So too is the decision considerably to increase
the resources for ARA in Northern Ireland, coming as it does on the
back of the earlier announcement that from April 2006 assets recovery
agencies in the UK will be able to invest half their proceeds in their
further work. We also welcome the new powers recently made available
to CAB, including to seize off-shore assets. We note the important
distinction between CAB, where officers seconded from the Garda and
other agencies bring their existing powers with them, and ARA where
that is not the case. We will continue to take a close interest in
this subject.

Tax

6.20 In our Third Report we said that we thought the criteria for the
deployment of Inland Revenue resources which made sense in the rest of
the UK did not necessarily reflect the seriousness of the threat of
paramilitary crime in Northern Ireland. We recommended that the Inland
Revenue, within the OCTF strategy and in conjunction with other law
enforcement agencies, should ensure its priorities for the enforcement
of the tax laws fully reflected this special challenge, recognising
that this might mean the development of a policy specifically for
Northern Ireland.

6.21 We have noted the steps being taken by the nascent HM Revenue and
Customs to bring together the investigation of direct and indirect tax
fraud, working with OCTF partners and other public agencies, and the
intention to tackle both kinds of fraud with increasing effectiveness.
We have noted too the value of the provision of taxpayer information
to other law enforcement bodies, the increasing use of Revenue
expertise in financial investigation and the use of tax enforcement to
disrupt organised crime. We continue to believe that tax enforcement
has a key role to play in combating paramilitary organised crime in
Northern Ireland and to believe that it must receive a priority
reflecting the very special threat that such crime presents. We will
want to follow this subject further.

Charities

6.22 In our previous full report we noted the very limited controls
over charities in Northern Ireland and the South and we referred to
the frequent allegations that paramilitary groups were able illicitly
to use funds raised for ostensibly charitable purposes as well as to
divert money obtained from crime. We welcomed the announcements by the
British and Irish Governments of their intention to introduce further
regulation over charities, and we asked them to keep us advised of
their progress. This they have been doing.

6.23 We are glad to see the proposals which the British Government
published in a consultation document in February for a full statutory
regime and the appointment of a charity commission16. The Government
said inter alia that it needed to address concerns that the lack of
tight controls in Northern Ireland provided opportunities for abuse by
organised criminals. We hope that in considering the responses to the
consultation and in drawing up the subsequent scheme they give full
weight to the need to ensure it is robust against both the suspicion
and the reality of abuse by paramilitaries or those associated with
them. In the case of the South, approval is being sought for new
institutional arrangements for the regulation of charities.

Once that approval has been given the intention is, we understand, to
move quickly with the preparation of the necessary legislation to give
effect to a new charities regime. We equally welcome this. The threat
from paramilitaries in Ireland North and South is unique, and the
controls need to take account of this. We await the detailed
proposals.

Conclusions

6.24 Several key points emerge from what we say above. The organised
crime threat is very significant and will be effectively tackled only
by vigorous targeted action over a long period. There has been much
welcome progress, and we applaud the PSNI, AGS, ARA, CAB and others
who have made it. But we are aware of no evidence suggesting the trend
is yet firmly set in the right direction. We are not persuaded that
there is yet a sufficiently holistic approach which encompasses all
possible means of preventing paramilitary organised crime and which
devotes the resources to the problem that it deserves. The concerted
operation of law enforcement and licensing is one example of this; our
earlier views on tax and charities were others.

16 Consultation on the Review of Charities Administration and
Legislation in Northern Ireland in 2005; Department for Social
Development, February 2005.

6.25 We will continue our examination of paramilitary organised crime
and the means of combating it in future reports. The nature of the
threat is such that it is imperative to explore every approach. Some
other countries have different legal structures and different
attitudes towards prosecutions. Some target organisations and the
networks they give rise to rather than the criminality of individuals.
We recognise that many of these issues have been explored before, but
we believe it is worth looking at them again, and this we plan to do.

7. RESPONDING TO PARAMILITARY GROUPS: SOME OTHER ISSUES

7.1 We return here briefly to two other issues to do with combating
paramilitary activities on which we have previously commented. They
are:

Restorative Justice Deference to Paramilitary groups Restorative
Justice

7.2 In our last full Article 4 report we considered community
restorative justice at some length17. We concluded that properly
operated it could be one of a range of measures which could help end
the role paramilitaries currently play in certain local communities,
though we emphasised that it was never acceptable that it should be a
cover for paramilitary influence. We recommended that the Secretary of
State should consider whether research could usefully be undertaken on
how and the extent to which restorative justice schemes could help
people turn away from paramilitaries in a way which ensured that
standards were maintained and safeguards fully observed.

7.3 Since then the Justice Oversight Commissioner, Lord Clyde, has
published a further report18. In it he spoke of the need to weave the
processes of restorative justice into the whole criminal justice
system. Lord Clyde commented that the recommendation of the Criminal
Justice Review on community schemes was being unacceptably delayed;
urged flexibility of approach on those concerned with its
implementation; and said that the schemes offered an opportunity for
community involvement which should be seen not as a threat but as a
possible advantage to the whole criminal justice system. He expressed
the hope that the opportunity should not be lost for securing
community involvement in a way which was consistent with human rights
and which supplemented the work of the statutory agencies. We believe
that Lord Clyde's conclusions are directly relevant to our earlier
conclusions, and we warmly endorse what he said.

17 IMC Third Report, paragraphs 6.2-6.5.

18 Third Report of the Justice Oversight Commissioner, January 2005.

7.4 In the meantime we have more fully examined community restorative
justice on the ground. We remain firmly of the view that, with the
appropriate safeguards and the assurance of proper standards, it can
play a valuable part in weaning communities and individuals from
paramilitary influence. Restorative justice can help repatriate the
administration of justice back to communities, where people feel
involved and responsible. We have spoken both to the victims of crime
and to young offenders.

We were struck by the way in which the victims felt that the
restorative justice scheme, because it was community based, had been
able to reflect their needs and had engaged on their behalf with
agencies able to address the underlying problems which had made them
more vulnerable to crime. And we saw at first hand how it had offered
victims and offenders alike an alternative to involvement with
paramilitaries.

7.5 Many communities in Northern Ireland have a strong sense of
identity. This can be a source of division and sometimes conflict. For
restorative justice it can mean that the schemes are able to have a
sure foundation and thereby to gain widespread support for what they
do. Schemes can in their turn help such communities build their own
capacity to influence behaviour in an acceptable way. They can help
communities and can also help guide communities to a proper co-
operation with and reliance on statutory agencies, including the
police. We have also heard that for ourselves from participants.

7.6 We have examined evaluations and other academic studies of
community restorative justice. They reinforce our earlier view. In the
published evaluation of one scheme 90% of the young people were under
verified paramilitary threat at the time of their referral. Evaluation
has shown a decrease in the number of paramilitary attacks and
exiling, and there are indications that paramilitary groups have
increasingly accepted schemes and were finding it more difficult to
exert their will violently. These evaluations also show clear signs of
community support.

7.7 We recognise that at a time of transition no path is likely to be
risk free, and community restorative justice certainly is not. That is
why we continue to emphasise the importance of applying proper
standards and safeguards, and of not allowing community schemes to be
a cover for the very paramilitary

influence we believe they are capable of lessening. Nor are such
schemes a complete answer. But we remain of the view that, given
adherence to these standards and safeguards, they can play a valuable
role in helping communities break from paramilitary control. We
believe support for them should be forthcoming from the criminal
justice agencies. We hope that greater momentum will be put into the
schemes, that there will be a courageous and imaginative approach to
their development and that schemes meeting proper standards should not
be held back by those which do not. We are very pleased to see that
the British Government is consulting interested parties about the
terms of guidelines on the interaction between community schemes and
the criminal justice system. As we previously recommended, we also
hope that consideration will be given to research into how they can
encourage people to turn from paramilitaries.

Ending Deference and Denying Legitimacy to Paramilitary Groups

7.8 We examined at some length in our previous report the question of
ending deference to paramilitary groups and denying them legitimacy19.
We set out carefully our view on what was proper and what was not in
dealing with paramilitaries. We recognised the difficult issues to
which this gave rise; praised those who courageously and successfully
navigated these waters in their quest for harmony and community
development; and recommended that the Secretary of State should
consider the preparation of suitable guidance which could both help
and encourage people through this time of transition. The very fact,
as we said above20, that the Belfast Agreement marked a watershed and
that the period of transition to the devolved government and a
peaceful and stable society which it envisaged must not continue
indefinitely, reinforces us in this view. Such guidance could sharpen
the challenge to the paramilitaries.

7.9 We have received very little comment on what we said, and none
that took issue with our thesis that deference and the conferral of
legitimacy needed to be addressed. We understand that the British
Government is pursuing our 19 IMC Third Report, paragraphs 6.6-6.17.

20 Paragraph 1.14.

recommendation. We continue to consider it important that thinking
should develop around the formulation of guidance. The issues are
intrinsically difficult; the ground will continue to move; we believe
that people are entitled to a lead so that they can conduct themselves
with confidence on the basis of careful consideration of the
questions; and we think that such guidance could play a useful role in
denying legitimacy to paramilitaries. We will be glad to play a part
in this.

8. PARAMILITARY GROUPS: LEADERSHIP

8.1 Article 4 requires us to assess whether the leadership of
paramilitary groups is directing activities or seeking to prevent
them.

Relationship between Paramilitary and Political Leadership

8.2 We have dealt at some length in our earlier reports with the
relationship between paramilitary and political leadership:

– In our first report in April 2004 we found there were associations
between the leadership of Sinn Féin and the Progressive Unionist Party
and respectively the PIRA and the UVF/RHC. We recommended that the
Secretary of State consider exercising the powers he had in the
absence of the Northern Ireland Assembly in respect of the salaries of
Assembly members and/or the funding of parties, and he removed the
latter for a period of twelve months; – In our second report on
paramilitary activity in November, noting that the measures the
Secretary of State had implemented still had six months to run, we
said we would consider the matter further in the light of the talks
involving the Northern Ireland political parties and the British and
Irish Governments which were then taking place; – In our ad hoc report
in February this year on the abductions and robbery at the Northern
Bank and on previous PIRA robberies we addressed ourselves to the
position of Sinn Féin and concluded that its association with PIRA had
not materially changed from the one we had described in the previous
Spring. We said that it should therefore bear its responsibility for
all the incidents we covered in that report, and we recommended that
the Secretary of State should consider exercising the powers he had to
implement measures applicable in the absence of the Assembly, namely
the financial ones. The Secretary of State announced on 22 February
that he proposed, subject to any representations made by Sinn Féin, to
extend by a further twelve months from the end of this April the
removal of block financial assistance to the party. He also said he
would propose to the British House of Commons a motion suspending
financial assistance to Sinn Féin at Westminster; such a measure was
implemented in April.

8.3 In the case of the Progressive Unionist Party we said in our first
report that we did not believe it had sufficiently discharged its
responsibility to exert all possible influence to prevent illegal
activities on the part of the UVF and the RHC. In the light of the
recommendation we then made the Secretary of State removed the
financial support given to the PUP in the Northern Ireland Assembly;
this sanction expires at the end of April 2005, as we present this
report.

8.4 The PUP responded to our recommendations and views of a year ago
in a full and detailed statement, which we have studied. The PUP said
that it was committed to peaceful and democratic means and was using
its influence to that end with the UVF and the RHC. It outlined its
work in support of community harmony, including in restorative
justice, and made clear its commitment to continuing it.

8.5 We have reviewed the situation. Regrettably we do not believe it
has materially changed. The UVF is still involved in violence and
other crime. We describe it in Section 2 as "active, violent and
ruthless". We believe now as we did a year ago that the PUP has not
done as much as it should in exerting influence to prevent such
activities. We therefore recommend that the Secretary of State should
continue the financial measures against the PUP in the Northern
Ireland Assembly.

8.6 The same issues of association between political parties with
elected members and paramilitary groups do not arise with the
dissident republicans, and their intentions are a great deal clearer.
Both the paramilitary groups themselves – CIRA, INLA and RIRA – and
the associated political parties – Republican Sinn Féin, the Irish
Republican Socialist Party, and the Thirty Two County Sovereignty
Movement – are committed to the achievement of a united Ireland by any
means, including the use of violence21. As we describe in Section 2
above, each of the groups is engaged in 21 We set out the background
and thinking of CIRA, INLA and RIRA and of the associated political
parties in Section 3 of our First Report.

terrorist violence and organised crime and each is committed to the
use of violence to further its aims. The restraint is not their
intentions but their capacity.

8.7 We have also considered the position of the Ulster Political
Research Group in the light of the UDA's statement in November that it
would desist from "military activity", focus on social and economic
issues within the community, and work with the British Government
towards an end to all paramilitary activity, and of the Secretary of
State's despecification of the UDA/UFF.

8.8 We note the UDA's stated commitment to engage in a process leading
to the eradication of all paramilitary activity and the UPRG's stated
desire to work to the same end. But as we show above22 the UDA was
still engaged in illegal activity throughout the 6 month period on
which we report here. We indicate above matters we will look at in
assessing whether a paramilitary group is making progress towards
giving up illegal activity or has actually done so23.

Leadership by Political Parties

8.9 We think it might be helpful if we indicated in this report the
sort of thing we believe political parties generally need to do in
order to demonstrate that they are giving the right leadership,
whether they are parties which are associated with paramilitaries or
over whom they may have influence, or not. We also think that it is
right to set out a challenge to any political parties which may find
themselves in positions of influence over paramilitaries.

8.10 Given the normal standards expected of political parties in a
democratic society, what should Northern Ireland political parties
achieve? They should:

– Make their commitment to the ending of all forms of paramilitary
crime credible and vocal.

– By any lawful means exert the maximum possible influence to the same
end over paramilitary groups and over individual members.

22 Paragraphs 2.16-2.19.

23 Paragraphs 1.15-1.17.

– Credibly and vocally challenge those members of paramilitary groups
who may be reluctant to give up crime, and give full support to those
who are ready to do so.

– Give credible, vocal and practical support to all parts of the
criminal justice system, including policing, and similarly accept the
definition of crime that the law lays down.

– Play a full and constructive role in the participative organs of the
criminal justice system such as the Policing Board and the District
Policing Partnerships.

– Within the framework of support for the rule of law, engage in open
and constructive debate with the two Governments and with the various
commissions and other bodies in Northern Ireland concerned with the
criminal justice system over the ending of all forms of paramilitary
crime and the establishment of firm community support for the criminal
justice system.

8.11 We referred in our ad hoc report in February on the robberies
committed by PIRA at the Northern Bank and elsewhere to Sinn Féin
appearing at times to have its own definition of what constitutes a
crime. It is axiomatic that anybody in a democracy, and so any
political party working within that democracy and publicly committed
to exclusively peaceful and democratic means, should accept the
definition of crime that the law of that country lays down. There can
be no equivocation over this issue, and the increasing focus on
paramilitary crime as a whole has raised it in the public
consciousness. This is not just an issue for Sinn Féin. It is a
fundamental point about the commitment of any of the Northern Ireland
political parties to democratic principles and their readiness fully
to dissociate themselves from illegal paramilitary activity.

8.12 We hope there will be open debate about these considerations and
that people will tell us what they think of them. We have no doubt
that they can be developed and refined. In addition to offering a
challenge to political parties we believe that debate will help
clarify questions that all have to face in this context.

8.13 In the aftermath of the murder of Robert McCartney and the
Northern Bank robbery, and at this point in the peace process, there
are a number of questions in people's minds about Sinn Féin's long
term aims and the nature of the leadership it may give to PIRA now or
in the future. These include the following. How does Sinn Féin now
view the claim made by PIRA to be the lawful government and
representative of the people in Ireland North and South? Does the
party seek power in Ireland North and South using paramilitary muscle
to back its participation in the political process? Does it ultimately
intend to participate fully in democratic politics, and to observe all
the standards that requires, but to reach that position maintaining
for the time being some form of slimmed down military capability? Or
is it now ready to ensure that PIRA ends all forms of illegal activity
and to engage whole heartedly in democratic politics and in policing?
In his statement of 6 April 2005 as President of Sinn Féin Gerry Adams
indicated views related to some of the considerations we raised
earlier in this Section and if he is able to develop this and to
deliver as he seems to have suggested he will have demonstrated
leadership of a high order.

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

9.1 Our objective under Article 3 is to carry out our functions with a
view "to promoting the transition to a peaceful society and stable and
inclusive devolved Government in Northern Ireland". Once again, we
have tried to do this by clearly setting out the facts on paramilitary
activity as we find them. We have also examined a number of issues
which we think are relevant to this objective, and we make
recommendations below which we believe will help serve it.

9.2 We draw the following key points from the preceding sections:

– In view of the judicial review proceedings in the Northern Ireland
courts, and bearing in mind the judgment, it is timely to restate that
the role of the IMC stems from the International Agreement and its
embodiment in the law of the UK and of Ireland, and that the enactment
of these laws by the respective Parliaments gives full democratic
legitimacy to that role.

– Paramilitary groups continue to be active in violent and other crime
and none have materially wound down their capability to commit violent
or other crime. It continues to be the case that dissident republican
groups are the most committed to continuing terrorism.

– We dislike the use of the word "punishment" in connection with the
vicious assaults and shootings which paramilitary groups inflict on
their victims, and believe that the time has come to stop giving it
currency, though we recognise the obligation of the media to report
accurately those public figures who themselves use the term.

– For the most part the downward trend in paramilitary violence has
continued though the number of paramilitary murders was comparable to
that in the previous two six month periods. Loyalist groups remain
responsible for more violence than republican ones.

– There is no sign that paramilitary groups have reduced their use of
exiling, and none we have found that they are agreeing to the general
return of those they have exiled or that they are considering doing
so.

– While we know that ex-prisoners have been amongst those who work to
promote peace and to develop communities, there are indications that a
considerable proportion of the prisoners released under the terms of
the Belfast Agreement have re-engaged in paramilitary activities or
have become involved in organised crime, or both.

– We remain concerned by the extent and nature of the involvement of
paramilitary groups in organised crime and are struck by the range of
criminal activities of some groups.

– We do not believe that the control and licensing regimes which apply
to licensed premises, security firms or taxis sufficiently reflect
multi-agency thinking or face the challenge of paramilitary
involvement in business of this kind. We think they should do so, as
one means of bearing down on paramilitary groups in all possible ways.

– We note the establishment in due course of the Serious and Organised
Crime Agency in the UK and will follow its contribution.

– We welcome the amendments made to the law and guidelines on the
Assets Recovery Agency in Northern Ireland and the law relating to the
Criminal Assets Bureau in the South and continue to emphasise the
importance of assets recovery in both jurisdictions in combating
paramilitary organised crime.

– We continue to believe that tax law enforcement has a key role to
perform in combating paramilitary organised crime in Northern Ireland.
We believe it must receive a priority reflecting the very special
threat that such crime presents.

– We welcome the public consultation on the establishment of an
effective regime for the supervision of charities in Northern Ireland
and emphasise the importance of its being robust in combating the
threat that paramilitaries or their associates may abuse charitable
status to their own advantage. We equally welcome the advanced stage
reached in establishing a new regime in the South.

– We warmly endorse Lord Clyde's view that early progress should be
made with the proposals on restorative justice in the Criminal Justice
Review; believe that, given adherence to proper standards and
safeguards, community restorative justice has a valuable role to play
in combating paramilitaries and their community control; and hope the
momentum behind such schemes will be developed so that those adhering
to the standards are not held back by others.

– We continue to believe that thinking should develop around the
formulation of guidance designed to help end deference to
paramilitaries and to deny legitimacy to them. We are glad the British
Government is pursuing our previous recommendation and will be glad to
play our part.

9.3 The indications which would encourage us to assess that a
paramilitary group was making material progress towards giving up
illegal activity would include: whether a group had taken the
strategic decision to give up illegal activity; had given a clear lead
to its members that they must do so; and had declared that as a group
it had stopped such activity. Other indications might include: whether
the group was taking steps to end its capability to undertake criminal
acts; whether it was cooperating with the police; and whether it was
lifting threats against people, including those it had exiled.

9.4 In assessing whether a group had actually stopped illegal
activity, we would continue to monitor and report on whether or not it
still:

– used violence in any form; – committed other crimes; – recruited or
trained members; – gathered intelligence, targeted people or procured
material; – exiled or intimidated people.

9.5 On the role of political parties, given the normal standards
expected of them in a democratic society, we have considered what
Northern Ireland political parties should achieve. They should:

– Make their commitment to the ending of all forms of paramilitary
crime credible and vocal.

– By any lawful means exert the maximum possible influence to the same
end over paramilitary groups and over individual members.

– Credibly and vocally challenge those members of paramilitary groups
who may be reluctant to give up crime, and give full support to those
who are ready to do so.

– Give credible, vocal and practical support to all parts of the
criminal justice system, including policing, and similarly accept the
definition of crime that the law lays down.

– Play a full and constructive role in the participative organs of the
criminal justice system such as the Policing Board and the District
Policing Partnerships.

– Within the framework of support for the rule of law, engage in open
and constructive debate with the two Governments and with the various
commissions and other bodies in Northern Ireland concerned with the
criminal justice system over the ending of all forms of paramilitary
crime and the establishment of firm community support for the criminal
justice system.

9.6 We hope there will be open debate about these issues and that
people will tell us what they think of them. Such debate can only
serve to help clarify questions all must face about the role of
political parties in the ending of paramilitary crime.

Recommendations

9.7 Article 7 of the International Agreement allows us to recommend:

– Any remedial action we consider necessary in respect of matters on
which we are reporting under Article 4.

– Any measure we think might appropriately be taken by the Northern
Ireland Assembly24.

– The second part of the Article is not applicable while the Assembly
remains unrestored, but that does not prevent us from saying what we
would have done had it been sitting, or from making recommendations to
the Secretary of State about the exercise of the powers he has in
these circumstances. We have done both these things in earlier
reports.

9.8 In responding to paramilitary crime we recommend that:

– The review now being undertaken of the licensing regime for the
security industry should take account of the need to ensure it bears
down to the maximum extent possible on paramilitary involvement, in
conjunction with other control regimes and other aspects of law
enforcement; 24 Article 7 is at Annex I. A summary of the statutory
measures the IMC can recommend for action by the Northern Ireland
Assembly is at Annex III.

– the arrangements for supervising the alcohol and taxi trades should
be examined with the same end in mind.

9.9 On leadership we recommend that the Secretary of State continues
the financial measures in force in respect of the Progressive Unionist
Party in the Northern Ireland Assembly.

ANNEX I INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UK AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND – ARTICLES 4 AND 7 Article 4

In relation to the remaining threat from paramilitary groups, the
Commission shall:

(a) monitor any continuing activity by paramilitary groups including:

i. attacks on the security forces, murders, sectarian attacks,
involvement in riots, and other criminal offences; ii. training,
targeting, intelligence gathering, acquisition or development of arms
or weapons and other preparations for terrorist campaigns; iii.
punishment beatings and attacks and exiling;

(b) assess:

i. whether the leaderships of such organisations are directing such
incidents or seeking to prevent them; and ii. trends in security
incidents.

(c) report its findings in respect of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
Article to the two Governments at six-monthly intervals; and, at the
joint request of the two Governments, or if the Commission sees fit to
do so, produce further reports on paramilitary activity on an ad hoc
basis.

Article 7 When reporting under Articles 4 and 6 of this Agreement, the
Commission, or in the case of Article 6(2), the relevant members
thereof shall recommend any remedial action considered necessary. The
Commission may also recommend what measures, if any, it considers
might appropriately be taken by the Northern Ireland Assembly, such
measures being limited to those which the Northern Ireland Assembly
has power to take under relevant United Kingdom law.

ANNEX II THE IMC'S GUIDING PRINCIPLES:

These guiding principles were set out in the statement the IMC issued
on 9 March 2004.

– The rule of law is fundamental in a democratic society.

– We understand that there are some strongly held views about certain
aspects of the legal framework, for example the special provisions
applying to terrorism, and that those holding these views will
continue to seek changes. But obedience to the law is incumbent on
every citizen.

– The law can be legitimately enforced only by duly appointed and
accountable law enforcement officers or institutions. Any other
forcible imposition of standards is unlawful and undemocratic.

– Violence and the threat of violence can have no part in democratic
politics. A society in which they play some role in political or
governmental affairs cannot – in the words of Article 3 – be
considered either peaceful or stable.

– Political parties in a democratic and peaceful society, and all
those working in them, must not in any way benefit from, or be
associated with, illegal activity of any kind, whether involving
violence or the threat of it, or crime of any kind, or the proceeds of
crime. It is incumbent on all those engaged in democratic politics to
ensure that their activities are untainted in any of these ways.

– It is not acceptable for any political party, and in particular for
the leadership, to express commitment to democratic politics and the
rule of law if they do not live up to those statements and do all in
their power to ensure that those they are in a position to influence
do the same.

ANNEX III SUMMARY25 OF MEASURES PROVIDED FOR IN UK LEGISLATION WHICH
MAY BE RECOMMENDED FOR ACTION BY THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY BY THE
INDEPENDENT MONITORING COMMISSION (IMC)

Article 7 of the International Agreement specifies that the IMC may
recommend measures for action by the Northern Ireland Assembly, such
measures being limited to those which the Northern Ireland Assembly
has powers to take under UK legislation. The full text of Article 7 is
in Annex I.

Measures which may be taken under UK legislation

(1) AMinister or junior Minister may be excluded by the Assembly from
holding office as a Minister or junior Minister for a period of not
less than three months and not more than twelve months.

(2) Members of a political party may be excluded by the Assembly from
holding office as Ministers or junior Ministers for a period of not
less than six months and not more than twelve months.

(3) A Minister or junior Minister may for a specified period have his
salary, or part of it, stopped by resolution of the Assembly.

(4) Members of the Assembly who are members of a particular political
party may for a specified period have their salaries, or part thereof,
stopped by resolution of the Assembly.

(5) The financial assistance which is payable to political parties may
be stopped in whole or in part by resolution of the Assembly.

25 This summary does not purport to be an authorative legal
interpretation of the relevant legislation. For the actual legislative
provisions see Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland
(Monitoring Commission etc.) Act 2003.

(6) A Minister, or a junior Minister of a political party may be
censured by a resolution of the Assembly.

Powers similar to those set out in (1) to (5) may in certain
circumstances be exercised by the Secretary of State.
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